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1 Introduction
There has been much debate recently about the
idea of imposing a financial transaction tax – a
broader version of the 1972 idea by Nobel Prize
winner James Tobin – to discourage speculative
behaviour by imposing a small tax on foreign
exchange transactions (Tobin 1978). For example,
Gordon Brown, then UK Prime Minister, raised it
at a G20 meeting in the immediate aftermath of
the global financial crisis. Subsequently, the idea
has been enthusiastically championed by the
French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, with some
support from the German Chancellor, Angela
Merkel. This has stimulated several significant
pieces of policy analysis on the issue (European
Commission 2010; IMF 2010); Leading Group on
Innovative Financing for Development 2010), as
well as a comprehensive systematic review
(McCulloch and Pacillo 2011).
The proponents of a financial transaction tax
(FTT) have two major motivations. First, taxing
financial transactions would be a highly visible
way to extract revenue from the banking sector;
this would meet the generally perceived need for
the financial sector to play, and pay, a more
significant contribution to the society in which it
is embedded. Second, FTTs could raise
significant revenue. At a time when the finances
of several Western nations are in a parlous state,
a significant new source of revenue is viewed
with great interest. Indeed, securing additional
funding for social development is also the main
objective of the ‘Robin Hood Tax’ campaign, run
by a consortium of national and development
NGOs, as well as churches and unions.1
It is interesting to note, therefore, that raising
revenue was not Tobin’s original intention. He
saw the tax as a mechanism to reduce the excess
volatility in foreign exchange markets by
discouraging short-term trading in favour of
longer-term investments. The idea was simple –
a tax on transactions costs a long-term investor
very little – but if the investor is speculating on a
daily or hourly basis, then paying a transaction
tax for each trade is extremely costly. By taxing
speculation in this way, Tobin suggested that
markets might be induced to be more stable.
It is important to recognise that, if an FTT
would have such a stabilising effect, this could
have significant economic benefits, since it could
reduce risk and uncertainty and thereby
encourage greater investment. Indeed, as the
recent crisis shows, it is perfectly possible that
the benefits from greater stability could far
outweigh the potential revenue gains, although
providing a precise estimate of such benefits is
extremely difficult. However, these benefits will
only arise if an FTT actually does stabilise
markets. This article draws on a recent
systematic review (McCulloch and Pacillo 2011)
of the evidence about whether FTTs stabilise
markets. We find that much of the evidence
points in the opposite direction – that such a tax
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would, if anything, increase volatility rather than
reduce it. A simple amendment to the Tobin Tax
is then proposed, entitled the Panic Tax, which
may be more effective in stabilising markets.
2 Financial transaction taxes and market
volatility – the evidence
Would an FTT dampen volatility in financial
markets or would it squeeze out liquidity,
potentially making volatility worse? There are
two approaches to this question. First, there is
extensive theoretical literature examining
whether such taxes would stabilise markets, along
with simulations showing how market
participants might react to the imposition of such
a tax. Second, there is empirical work examining
the actual impact on markets when similar taxes
have been imposed in various countries.
2.1 Theoretical models
Over the last 20 years, a new generation of
theoretical models has looked at the ‘microstructure’
of financial markets to try and explain the
behaviour of real financial markets. These models
typically assume that market actors apply rules of
thumb when making decisions to buy or sell.
A distinction is usually drawn between
‘fundamentalist’ traders (i.e. those that trade
based on a view about the fundamental value of
the assets) and ‘noise’ traders (i.e. speculators).
The volatility of the market is therefore driven
by what share of market traders are noise traders
(who increase volatility) and what share are
fundamentalists (who reduce it). In such models,
an FTT will have an effect on volatility if the
imposition of the tax changes the share of noise
traders in the market.
Generally speaking, theoretical models find that
an FTT should reduce volatility by reducing the
number of noise traders. But many models also
suggest that care should be taken in choosing the
size of the tax. If it is too large, the reductions in
market trading and liquidity could result in an
increase rather than a decrease in volatility (see
Westerhoff 2008 and McCulloch and Pacillo
2011, for more comprehensive treatment of the
theoretical literature).
2.2 Empirical evidence
Real financial markets do not necessarily behave
the way that theoretical models predict. Most of
the studies examining the link between
transaction costs and volatility find a positive
relationship between the two – that is higher
transaction costs are associated with more,
rather than less volatility. For example,
Bessembinder and Rath (2002) analyse stocks
moving from the NASDAQ stock market to the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). They find
strong evidence that the newly NYSE listed
stocks reduce both trading costs and the
volatility of daily returns. Similarly, Hau (2006)
studies French stocks, finding that a 20 per cent
increase in transaction costs generates an
increase in volatility of about 30 per cent.
Studies of foreign exchange markets also suggest
that higher transaction costs are associated with
greater volatility. For example, Aliber et al.
(2003) look at transaction costs, volatility and
trading volume in foreign exchange markets.
They find that an increase of 0.02 per cent in
transaction costs leads to an increase of volatility
of 0.5 percentage points.
Lanne and Vesala (2010) confirm this finding
with both daily and intra-daily data on Deutsche
mark to US dollar and yen to US dollar exchange
rates from 1992 to 1993. They estimate the
relationship between the volatility of this market
and the transaction costs involved in trading.
Their results show that the effect of transaction
costs on volatility is positive and significant. An
increase of 0.01 per cent in transaction costs
raises the variance of the Deutsche mark by
1.16 per cent relative to its average; the increase
for the yen is 1.21 per cent, substantially larger
than the increase calculated by Aliber et al. (2003).
Turning to the few studies of actual transaction
taxes, we find a similar story. Sweden introduced
a 1 per cent round trip tax on equity transactions
in 1984, which was increased to 2 per cent in
1986. Umlauf (1993) compares the performance
of the Swedish stock market under the no tax,
1 per cent and 2 per cent tax regimes. He
concludes that the imposition and increase of the
transaction tax increased volatility. He also notes
that there was huge market diversion from the
Swedish towards the London stock market as a
result of the tax.
On the other hand, Saporta and Kan (1997) find
no significant effect of UK stamp duty
imposition on the volatility of equity prices in the
UK. Similarly, Chou and Wang (2006) examine
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the impact of the decision by the Taiwanese
government in 2000 to reduce the tax levied on
Futures transactions on the Taiwan Futures
Exchange and find no significant effect on price
volatility, although the amount of trading was
significantly reduced. Phylaktis and Aristidou
(2007) also find that a securities transaction tax
(STT) – an FTT on equities – on the Athens
Stock Exchange had no overall impact on
volatility, although it decreased volatility in ‘bull’
periods and increased it in ‘bear’ periods. Finally,
Su and Zheng (2011) have analysed the impact of
changes in STT rates in the Shanghai Stock
Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange (SZSE). They find, paradoxically, that
both increasing and reducing the STT increased
volatility. In the former case, increasing the tax
reduced market liquidity, pushing up volatility; in
the latter case, the lower transaction tax induced
more speculation, also raising volatility.
It is important to note that the empirical
literature reviewed above suffers from a number
of methodological weaknesses. Studies use a
range of different measures of volatility, making
it hard to compare the results across studies.
Moreover, all of the empirical studies focus on
day-to-day (or shorter period) volatility. However,
such short-run fluctuations may not matter very
much to the broader economy. By contrast,
crashes and major market adjustments can have
significant and long-lasting effects. Indeed
Tobin’s original intent was that the tax should
help to make exchange rates reflect long-term
fundamentals, rather than short-run volatility.
Theoretically, a tax on transactions might
discourage equity financing in favour of bank
financing. If reliance on bank financing creates
greater systemic instability than equity
financing, an FTT might increase the probability
of crashes. At the same time, if a tax was
successful in discouraging destabilising trades,
then it could reduce this probability.
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there are no
papers which look at the impact of FTTs on the
probability of a crash or adjustment taking place.
Nonetheless, the overall conclusion from the
empirical evidence is more one-sided than the
theoretical work. The balance of evidence
suggests that there is a positive relationship
between transaction costs and volatility, although
the size of this effect varies across different
studies. Whether a Tobin Tax would affect
volatility in the same way as underlying market
transaction costs is not clear. The Swedish
experience of imposing a tax on equity
transactions may have increased volatility, but
the size of the tax was large; there is no evidence
that UK stamp duty had any effect on volatility,
although it clearly affected returns on equity.
Certainly, however, there appears to be little
support for the idea that an FTT would
significantly reduce the volatility of real markets.
3 Discouraging manias and panics
As noted above, the empirical literature on the
relationship between FTTs and market volatility
has focused on day-to-day volatility. However, it is
the herd behaviour associated with mass entry
into, or exit from, a market that first creates and
then bursts asset price bubbles. These major
market realignments cause far more damage
than small changes in day-to-day volatility, yet
the existing literature tells us almost nothing
about the impact of FTTs on panics and crashes.
This said, it would seem likely that a small
transaction tax will have practically no effect in
either tempering booms or preventing crashes; if
the market rises by several percentage points,
traders are unlikely to be dissuaded from entry
or exit by a small FTT (0.05 per cent, the typical
magnitude proposed).2 In short, ‘sand in the
wheels of finance’ will do nothing to prevent
booms or crashes.3
This naturally begs the question of whether
there might be another type of tax that would be
more effective. Specifically, might it be possible
to design a tax to promote market stability by
discouraging manias and panics?
3.1 Do not tax trade, tax panic
Engineering provides a surprisingly simple
solution to this problem. Taxing transactions
using an FTT creates a form of ‘resistance’ in
financial markets. As noted, this might (or might
not) reduce the size of the peaks and troughs in
the financial markets, but will not protect
against sudden crashes or rises in the market.
However, the fundamental problem lies not with
the size of the peaks and troughs, but with how
rapidly prices rise and fall (known in engineering
as the frequency distribution).
Engineers routinely remove undesired high
frequencies using ‘low-pass filters’ – in their
simplest electronic form inductors (tightly
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wound coils of wire) placed in a circuit. The
resistance of the inductor changes proportionally
to the rate of change of the current. Low
frequencies face minimal resistance and the
current passes through but when the frequency
is high, increased resistance blocks the current.
A tax with the same properties would help to
prevent spikes.
An inductance tax, or Panic Tax, would tax
transactions at a variable rate proportional to the
rate of change of the aggregate market price – in
contrast to a FTT’s small fixed rate. Sales and
purchases would incur virtually no tax during
normal times when the aggregate market
movement is very small. But during crashes and
booms, when aggregate market movements are
large, they would face heavy penalties. Thus, a
market participant wanting to exit the market
when everyone else is doing the same, would face
extremely high taxation. This could act as an
incentive to wait and, in so doing, would lessen the
market panic. Similarly, during manias in which
market prices are rising sharply, traders would be
taxed heavily, dissuading them from further
purchases and thereby, moderating the boom.
Similar ideas to the inductance tax have been
proposed before. For example, Spahn (1996)
proposed a two-tier Tobin Tax, where the tax rate
would rise if market volatility rose above a
certain threshold. The advantage of a Panic Tax
is that it would not need to create arbitrary
thresholds between the lower and upper tier tax
rates – the tax rate will rise automatically
proportionate to the change in the aggregate
market price.
3.2 Queuing as a form of taxation
One difficulty in implementing such a Panic Tax
would be to persuade market participants to pay
a tax, the value of which would only be known a
short period in advance. An alternative could be
to force people who wish to buy or sell an asset to
wait in a queue. When more participants are
attempting to leave (or join) the market at the
same time, the queue will be longer and
therefore the effective tax will be higher.
Furthermore, such a scheme would allow the
market to determine the price of impatience. If
some market participants value exiting or
entering a market more highly than others, it
would be possible to allow those queuing to sell
their places. In this way, those who really need to
sell immediately could purchase a place higher
up in the queue.
Since a Panic Tax has never been implemented,
it is hard to know exactly what its effect would be
in practice. However, simulations by Varela and
McCulloch (2011) show that a Panic Tax would
be almost three times more effective than a
Tobin Tax/FTT in reducing volatility in
situations where market sentiment is strong.
4 Reimagining the financial markets
The havoc wreaked on many advanced economies
by the global financial crisis means that, for the
first time in over 30 years, serious efforts are
under way to ‘reimagine’ the financial sector
(Turner et al. 2010). A huge raft of legislation
(e.g. Dodd-Frank Act) and new regulations
(Basel III) have been put into place, most with
the explicit objective of reducing systemic risk
and ensuring that the financial sector makes a
greater contribution in a broad sense. Among the
many proposals still being considered, is the idea
of a financial transaction tax or Tobin Tax, due to
its purported ability to stabilise markets and
raise revenue.
Despite some support from theoretical models,
the empirical evidence suggests that an FTT
would not stabilise markets, although, if
appropriately designed, it would probably not
destabilise them much either. However, a Panic
Tax, in which the rate of taxation depends on the
rate at which the aggregate market is changing,
might be considerably more stabilising. By taxing
panics and booms, rather than normal trade, it
would focus attention on the market behaviour
that does the most harm. Moreover, by
discouraging entry during booms and exit during
panics, it could help to reduce both, allowing
policymakers time to make orderly adjustments
during such crises. Furthermore, because such a
tax would not collect a substantial sum of money
during normal times, it would avoid the need for
costly efforts to prevent substitution into untaxed
assets or migration of trade to untaxed locations
– one of the main practical objections to an FTT.
A Panic Tax, therefore, might provide a useful
complement to other regulatory measures in
promoting more stable financial markets.
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Notes
1 See www.robinhoodtax.com for details.
2 Varela and McCulloch (2011) ‘The Impact of a
Panic Tax on Financial Market Volatility’
shows that transaction costs play almost no
role in reducing transactions when market
sentiment is running high.
3 Indeed the failure of FTTs to address issues of
systemic stability is the main reason given by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2010)
for opposing their introduction.
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